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Research on Optimization Decision-making of Closed-loop
Supply Chain under Loss Aversion
Zhou YanJu1, Ma Jing
Business School, Central South University, Changsha, 410083
Abstract: This paper consider optimization decision-making of closed-loop supply chain based on revenue sharing contract
and prospect theory, and study the effect of lose aversion on the performance of closed-loop supply chain. We establish a
decision-making model for the closed-loop supply chain which consists a loss averse retailer and a loss averse manufacturer.
Through the analysis of this model under both centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain, we show how the
characteristic of loss aversion affect optimal order quantity and optimal wholesale price respectively, and display the
relationship between recycling price and loss aversion coefficient. In the last part of the model analysis, we give the
conditions which can realize perfect coordination of the closed-loop supply chain. Finally, we give a numerical example to
verify all the conclusions we obtain.

Keywords: Loss averse; Closed-loop supply chain; Optimization decision

1.

INTRODUCTION
With the growing understanding of sustainable development, the research of closed-loop supply chain gains

widely attention from both industry and academic. Closed-loop supply chain is composed by different economic
entities, each entity is aim to maximize his own revenue. While, this individual’s rational behavior often result
in poor performance. Previous studies have demonstrated that supply chain member’s risk attitude will affect the
performance of supply chain system. Loss aversion as one of closed-loop supply chain member’s risk attitudes
has not been studied.
Recently, the study of closed-loop supply chain has received widespread concerns. At present, most of
researches in this area are concentrating on pricing strategy and optimizing coordination. Savaskan and
Wassenhove[1][2] focus on the interaction effect between recycling strategy and new product’s pricing strategy. Q
and JH[3] use game theory to study pricing strategy and coordination mechanism of closed-loop supply chain. Da
and Li[4] use game theory to test the impact of decision-making power’s leadership on efficiency. To further
research, a number of scholars extended closed-loop supply chain research to the case of multi-stage. Amaro
and Barbosa-Povoaa[5] establish a multi-stage planning model which considering the uncertainty of recycling
product demand and price. G and P[6] design a multi-gradient, multi-stage and multi-product closed-loop supply
chain network based on the example of recycled lead-acid battery. With the increasing complexity of the model,
different algorithms have been used to solve models and increase computational efficiency. Georgiadis and
Vlachos[7], Kannan[6] and Ouyang[8] , Huang and Qiu[9] use different methods and algorithms to solve the
problems. The above literatures regard the supply chain members as risk neutral, so Shi and Chen[10] use
downside-risk measure theory to study optimization decision-making of the closed-loop supply chain which
consists of one risk neutral manufacturer and one risk averse retailer. Gao and Chen[11] study two stage
closed-loop supply chain which composed by one risk averse retailer and one risk averse manufacturer with
conditional value at risk (CVaR).
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Loss aversion as an important basic principle of prospect theory has been widely adopted in newsboy
problems and supply chain issues. S and Z[12] explain in detail what is loss aversion. Shen and Xu[13] point out
that the manufacturer's purchasing quantity and procurement time have relationship with his loss averse attitude.
Wen[14] find that the optimal order quantity is related to the degree of loss aversion. Lin and Cai[15] analysis
supply chain model under loss aversion by sub-linear utility function, and find that the optimal order quantity
and expected utility are decreasing with the increase of loss averse degree. In the existing literature of
closed-loop supply chain, Loss aversion has not been mentioned.
Our paper analyze the closed-loop supply chain optimization decision-making based on prospect theory,
and explore the effect of lose aversion on optimal order quantity, whole sale price and recycle price with
theoretical analysis and numerical analysis. At last, we compared the size relationships of optimal order quantity
between decentralized supply chain and integrated supply chain.
2.

SYMBOLS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this paper, we study a two-stage closed-loop supply chain, which consists of one loss averse retailer and

one loss averse manufacturer. Manufacturer product one single short life production, retailer forecast the market
demand to make orders. We assume retailer is responsible for waste product’s recycling, and manufacturer
receives all waste products retailer recovery. Related symbols and assumptions are:
Cm : unit cost of production; Crm : unit cost of reproduction; w : unit wholesale price; p : unit retail price;

q : order quantity; b1 : manufacturer’s unit recovery cost; b2 : retailer’s unit recovery cost; s : unit salvage
value of the remaining products; λ r : retailer’s loss aversion coefficient; λ s : manufacturer’s loss aversion
coefficient; λ sc : supply chain’s loss aversion coefficient; x : random demand; f ( x) : density function of random
demand; F ( x) : distribution function of random demand.
Our assumptions refer to the relevant assumptions in the paper of Gao and Chen[11]:
(1)The recovery amount of waste product L(b2 , q ) = εb2 q , ε is the sensitivity coefficient and 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 b2
for the recovery quantity is less than the retailer’s order quantity.
(2)We assume p > w, w > s, Cm ≥ s, ϕ( p − s ) > w, Cm > Crm + b1 > b1 > b2 > 0 , p (1 − ϕ) < Cm to ensure the problem
we research has practical significance.
(3)We do not consider the case of product return, and ignore the inventory and shortage costs.
(4) Manufacturer and retailer are rational; they make decisions to maximize their own expected utility.
(5)Operation process is: before the start of the sales season, manufacturer provides revenue sharing contract
T ( w, b1 , ϕ, q, b2 ) to retailer, ϕ is the revenue sharing ratio, retailer determine the optimal order quantity and
the optimal recovery price of waste products.
(6)All the recovery waste products can be reproduced.
(7) Information is completely symmetrical.
In this paper, we adopt a simple piecewise-linear function to describe the characteristic of loss aversion. Let
W0 present the initial wealth of decision maker, the utility function that reflects supply chain member’s loss
aversion characteristic can be expressed as:

W − W0 , W ≥ W
U (W ) = 
(1).
λ(W − W0 ), W < W0
λ is the decision maker's loss aversion coefficient and λ ≥ 1 , the greater of λ means the higher degree
of loss aversion. We assume decision-maker’s initial wealth equal to zero, that is W0 = 0 . The function we
adopt can not only reflect the basic characteristic of S-shaped curve, but also simplify the calculation.
3.

THE MODELS
We consider the effect of loss aversion characteristic on centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply

chain respectively.
3.1 Centralized closed-loop supply chain
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According to the above assumptions and related symbols, random revenue function of the closed-loop
supply chain can be expressed as:
Πsc ,1 = ( p − s ) x − (Cm − s )q + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q, x < q
Πsc = 
(2) .
x≥q
Πsc ,2 = pq − Cm q + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q,
Obviously, the random revenue function is a piecewise function, Πsc ,1 presents the revenue when order
quantity is less than demand, Πsc ,2 presents the revenue when order quantity is more than demand. According
to the random revenue function, we can get the expected profit function:
q

+∞

0

q

πsc = E Πsc = E Πsc ,1 + E Πsc ,2 = ∫ (( p − s ) x + sq ) f ( x)dx + ∫

pqf ( x) − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q. (3)

In order to get utility function that can reflect lose aversion characteristic, let Πsc ,1 = 0 ( Πsc ,2 > 0 ), we get the
break-even demand

xsc* of closed-loop supply chain:
xsc* =

− s + Cm − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2
q, (4)
p−s

*
set qsc
= xsc* , we know that when market demand X < qsc* , the revenue of closed-loop supply chain is negative,

when X > qsc* , the revenue is positive. Thus the utility function can be expressed as:

( p − s ) x − (Cm − s )q + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q, qsc* ≤ x ≤ q

U sc =  pq − Cm q + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q,
x ≥ q (5)

*
λ sc [( p − s ) x − (Cm − s )q + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q ], x < qsc
According to the definition of expected utility function, we get the expected utility function of closed-loop
supply chain:
q*sc

EU sc = (λ sc − 1) ∫ [( p − s ) x + ( s − Cm )q + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q ] f ( x)dx + π sc .(6)
0

Through the above analysis, we can draw proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Expected utility function is a concave function on order quantity q , and optimal order quantity
Qsc* satisfy the first order condition equation.
−(λ sc − 1)( p − s ) F (qsc* (Qsc* ))

− s + Cm − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2
+ ( s − p ) F (Qsc* ) + p − Cm + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 = 0.(7)
p−s

Proof: The first order and second order derivatives of expected utility function on the order quantity q are:
∂EU sc
− s + Cm − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2
= −(λ sc − 1)( p − s ) F (qsc* )
+ ( s − p ) F (Qsc* ) + p − Cm + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 ,
∂q
p−s
2
∂ 2 EU sc
* ( − s + Cm − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 )
=
−
(
λ
−
1)
f
(
q
)
− ( p − s ) f (q).
sc
sc
p−s
∂q 2
Obviously, the second order derivative is negative, according to the definition of concave function, we
know EU sc is the concave function on order quantity q , let the first order derivative equal to zero, we can get

the expression of the optimal order quantity, so proposition 1 is proved.
Proposition 2 Optimal order quantity is decrease with the loss aversion degree, the higher the level of loss
aversion, the less the optimal order quantity.
Proof: As optimal order quantity function is an implicit function, it is not easy to analyze the impact of loss
aversion coefficient λ sc on the optimal order quantity. To simplify, we refer to the idea of the Lin and Cai [15],
set

βsc =

− s + Cm − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 , then the optimal order quantity function can be simplified as:
p−s
−(λ sc − 1)β sc F (β sc Qsc* ) − F (Qsc* ) + 1 − β sc = 0. (8)

Set Vsc = −(λ sc − 1)β sc F (β sc Qsc* ) − F (Qsc* ) + 1 − β sc , according to the derivation rules of the implicit function, we
can get formula (9):
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dQsc*
∂V ∂λ sc
F (qsc* (Qsc* ))
= − sc
=
−
< 0. (9)
d λ sc
∂Vsc ∂Qsc*
(λ sc − 1)βsc f (qsc* (Qsc* )) + f (Qsc* )
From the formula (9), we can derive the conclusion that in the centralized closed-loop supply chain, the optimal
order quantity is decrease with loss aversion coefficient. This indicates that loss aversion characteristic does
affect the system’s optimal order quantity. Prospect theory tell us that when the marginal shortage cost is less
than the marginal depreciation cost, the retailer's optimal order quantity will increase with the loss aversion
coefficient. In this paper, we assume that shortage cost is zero and salvage value is less than the wholesale price,
this assumption meet with the above condition, so proposition 2 is consistent with previous conclusion.
Proposition 3 Recycling price is decrease with loss aversion coefficient if recycling price is higher than optimal
recycling price and is increase with the loss aversion coefficient if recycling price is lower than optimal
recycling price. Loss aversion has no effect on the optimal recycling price.
Proof: According to the above implicit function (8), we can get formula (10) as follow:
∂V ∂λ sc
βsc F (βsc Qsc* )
db2
= − sc
=−
.(10)
ε(2b2 − Cm + Crm )
d λ sc
∂Vsc ∂b2
[(λ sc − 1) F (β sc Qsc* ) + (λ sc − 1)β sc Qsc* f (qsc* (Qsc* )) + 1]
p−s

Formula (10) is positive or negative depends on the size of 2b2 − Cm + Crm , if 2b2 − Cm + Crm > 0 , then db2
,
<0
d λ sc
if 2b2 − Cm + Crm < 0 , then db2
. This suggest that if retailer provide a higher recycling price, recycling
d λ sc

>0

price is decrease with loss aversion coefficient, and if retailer provide a lower recycling price, recycling price is
increase with the loss aversion coefficient. (Cm − Crm ) 2 is the optimal recycling price, it can be derived as
following:
Let ∂EU sc
, it’s easy to get the formula of the optimal recycling price, that is
= εb2 q − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εq = 0
∂b2

Cm − Crm
, (11)
2
formula (11) tell us the optimal recycling price has nothing to do with loss aversion coefficient under centralized
b2*sc =

closed-loop supply chain, and retailer’s optimal recycling price is determined by manufacturer’s produce cost
and reproduce cost.
3.2 Decentralized closed-loop supply chain system
In decentralized closed-loop supply chain system, the retailer's random revenue function can be expressed
as following:

Πr ,1

Π
= ϕ[ px + s (q − x)] + b1εb2 q − ϕεb22 q − wq, x < q

Πr =  r ,1
(12).
2
x≥q
Πr ,2 = ϕpq + b1εb2 q − ϕεb2 q − wq,
is the revenue when demand is less than the order quantity and Πr ,2 is the revenue when demand is

more than the order quantity. The expected revenue function of retailer

πr is:

πr = E Πr = E Πr ,1 + E Πr ,2 = ϕ[ pq − ∫ ( p − s )(q − x) f ( x)dx] + b1εb2 q − ϕεb22 q − wq.(13)
q

0

Obviously Πr ,2 > 0 , set Πr ,1 = 0 , we get the break-even demand xr* of retailer, and xr* =

ϕεb22 + w − b1εb2 − ϕε
q.
ϕ( p − s )

Set qr* = xr* , this means when demand X < qr* , the revenue of retailer is negative, when demand X > qr* , the
revenue of retailer is positive. So the utility function U r of retailer can be expressed as:

ϕ[ px + s (q − x)] + b1εb2 q − ϕεb22 q − wq, qr* ≤ x < q

U r = ϕpq + b1εb2 q − ϕεb22 q − wq,
x ≥ q (14) .

2
*
λ r [ϕ[ px + s (q − x)] + b1εb2 q − ϕεb2 q − wq ], x < qr
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According to function (14), we can get the formula of expected utility function EU r :
qr*

EU r = (λ r − 1) ∫ {ϕ[ px + s (q − x)] + b1εb2 q − ϕεb22 q − wq} f ( x)dx + πr . (15)
0

Similarly, we get manufacturer’s expected revenue function πs and expected utility function EΠs :
q

πs = E Πs = (1 − ϕ)[ pq − ∫ ( p − s )(q − x) f ( x)dx + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q − (1 − ϕ)εb22 q + wq − qCm ], (16)
0

qs*

EU s = (λ s − 1) ∫ {(1 − ϕ)[ px + s (q − x)] + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q − (1 − ϕ)εb22 q + wq − qCm } f ( x)dx + π s . (17)
0

And the break-even demand is xs* =

(1 − ϕ)εb22 − w + Cm − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 − (1 − ϕ) s
q.
(1 − ϕ)( p − s )

From the above analysis, we derive proposition 4.
Proposition 4 EU r is a concave function on order quantity q , optimal order quantity Qr* satisfy the first order
condition equation
ϕεb22 + w − b1εb2 − ϕs
−(λ r − 1)ϕ( p − s ) F (qr* (Qr* ))
+ ϕp − ϕ( p − s ) F (Qr* ) + b1εb2 − ϕεb22 − w = 0. (18)
ϕ( p − s )
Proof : The first order and second order derivatives of expected utility function (15) on order quantity q are:

∂EU r
ϕεb22 + w − b1εb2 − ϕs
= −(λ r − 1)ϕ( p − s ) F (qr* )
+ ϕp − ϕ( p − s ) F (Q ) + b1εb2 − ϕεb22 − w,
∂q
ϕ( p − s )
∂ 2 EU r
(ϕεb22 + w − b1εb2 − ϕs ) 2
= −(λ s − 1) f (qr* )
− f (q )ϕ( p − s ).
2
ϕ( p − s )
∂q
So, the second order derivative is negative, EU r is a concave function on order quantity q . Set the first order
derivative equal to zero, we can get the function of Qr* , that is formula (18), proposition 4 is proved.
Proposition 5 Optimal order quantity is decrease with the loss aversion coefficient, that is the more of loss
aversion, the less of optimal order quantity.
Proof: As the optimal order quantity function is an implicit function, it is not easy to analyze the impact of loss
aversion coefficient λ r on the optimal order quantity. We refer to the idea of the Lin and Cai [15],
set

βr =

ϕεb22 + w − b1εb2 − ϕs . The optimal order quantity function can be expressed as:
ϕ( p − s )

−(λ r − 1)βr F (βr Qr* ) − F (Qr* ) + 1 − βr = 0.
(19)
Let Vr = −(λ r − 1)βr F (βr Qr* ) − F (Qr* ) + 1 − βr , according to the derivation law of implicit function, we can
derive the following formula:
dQr*
∂V ∂λ r
F (qr* (Qr* ))
=− r
=−
< 0.
*
d λr
∂Vr ∂Qr
(λ r − 1)βr f (qr* (Qr* )) + f (Qr* )
Obviously, optimal order function is decrease with loss aversion coefficient, that means optimal order
quantity is decrease with the retailer’s loss aversion coefficient. Since we assume shortage cost is zero and
salvage value is less than the whole sale price, proposition 5 is consistent with the existing conclusion.
Proposition 6 Wholesale price is decrease with the retailer’s loss aversion coefficient, and increase with the
manufacturer’s loss aversion coefficient.
Proof:

First we consider retailer, according to function (19), we get the following formula:

∂V ∂λ r
dw
=− r
=−
d λr
∂Vr ∂w

βr F (βr Qr* )
1
[(λ r − 1) F (βr Qr* ) + (λ r − 1)βr Qr* f (qr* (Qr* )) + 1]
ϕ( p − s )

< 0.

We can see that the wholesale price is decrease with the retailer’s loss aversion coefficient. This is consistent
with the proposition 5, because from proposition 5 we know the optimal order quantity is decrease with the
retailer’s loss aversion coefficient. In order to increase profits, manufacturer will decrease the wholesale price to
encourage retailer to increase the order quantity.
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(1− ϕ)εb22 − w + Cm − (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 − (1 − ϕ)s
, we get the
(1− ϕ)( p − s )
optimal order function for manufacturer, the function is:
Vs = −(λ s − 1)β s F (β s Qs* ) − F (Qs* ) + 1 − β s . (20)
Now we consider manufacturer, set βs =

Derivative of wholesale price on loss aversion coefficient is:

∂V ∂λ s
dw
=− s
=−
d λs
∂Vs ∂w

−βs F (β s Qs* )

> 0.
1
[(λ s − 1) F (β s Qs* ) + (λ s − 1)β s Qs* f (qs* (Qs* )) + 1]
(1− ϕ)( p − s )
So wholesale price function is increase with loss aversion coefficient, this means wholesale price is
increase with the manufacturer’s loss aversion degree. If manufacturer is loss averse, he would like to increase
the wholesale price to ensure his profits.
Proposition 7 If recycling price is higher than optimal recycling price, recycling price is decrease with the
retailer’s loss aversion coefficient. If recycling price is lower than optimal recycling price, recycling price is
increase with the retailer’s loss aversion coefficient. Loss aversion has no effect to the optimal recycling price.
Proof: According to function (19), we derive the following formula:

db2
∂V ∂λ r
βr F (βr Qr* )
=− r
=−
. (21)
ε(2ϕb2 − b1 )
d λr
∂Vr ∂b2
*
*
*
*
[(λ r − 1) F (βr Qr ) + (λ r − 1)βr Qr f (qr (Qr )) + 1]
ϕ( p − s )
db2
< 0 ,and if
Formula (21) is negative or positive depends on the size of 2ϕb2 − b1 , if 2ϕb2 − b1 > 0 , then
d λr

db2
> 0 .This implies that if retailer offer higher price to consumers, recycling price is
d λr
decrease with the retailer’s lose aversion coefficient, and if retailer offer lower price, recycling price is increase
with the retailer’s lose aversion coefficient. This can be explained, when recycling price b2 is higher, the unit
profit of recycling waste products (b1 − b2 ) is small, so when the loss aversion of retailer increases, retailer tends
to reduce b2 . When recycling price b2 is lower, the unit profit of recycling waste products is large, so when the
loss aversion of retailer increase, retailer will reduce wholesale price to increase recycling products to obtain
b1
higher profits.
is the optimal recycling price of retailer, it can be derived as:
2ϕ
∂EU r
b
= b1εq − 2ϕεb2 q = 0,
b2*r = 1 .
let
∂b2
2ϕ
Retailer’s optimal recycling price function is a linear function of manufacturer’s recycling price, and has
nothing to do with loss aversion. Manufacturer can encourage retailer to try hard to recycle by choose
appropriate recycling price.
3.3. Comparison of two kind of closed-loop supply chain system
Through the above analysis, whether it is centralized closed-loop supply chain or decentralized closed-loop
supply chain, the optimal order quantity is decrease with the loss aversion coefficient λ . In these two cases, we
derive two optimal order quantity, now we compare these two kinds of optimal order quantity.
From function (8) and (9) we know, the relationship of Qr* and Qsc* is determined by the size of β and
λ .We assume λ sc = λ r , then the size of βsc and β r determine the size of Qr* and Qsc* . Let βsc = βr , we get
2ϕb2 − b1 < 0 , then

the optimal wholesale price function:

w* = ϕCm − ϕ(Cm − Crm − b2 sc )εb2 sc + εb2 r (b1 − ϕb2 r ). (22)
This means that when w = w* , Qr* = Qsc* . Through the analysis of the 3.1, we know Qsc* has nothing to do with
wholesale price w , while according to the implicit function we get from 3.2, we know that the retailer’s
optimal order quantity has negative correlation with the wholesale price. That is:
dQr*
∂Vr ∂w
−(λ r − 1)[ F (qr* (Qr* )) + βr Qr* f (qr* (Qr* ))] − 1
=−
=
−
< 0. (23)
dw
∂Vr ∂Qr*
−(λ r − 1)( w − ϕs )βr f (qr* (Qr* )) − ϕ( p − s ) f (Qr* )
This suggests that in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain, the optimal order quantity function is decrease
with wholesale price. So we draw the conclusion that if w = w* then Qr* = Qsc* , and if w > w* then Qr* < Qsc* .
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Let w = w* , b2*r = b2*sc , the closed-loop supply chain can achieve perfect coordination because the revenue
function of closed-loop supply chain is:
Πsc ,1 = ( p − s ) x + sq + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q − Cm q, x < q
Πsc = 
(24) ,
x≥q
Πsc ,2 = pq + (Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q − Cm q,
and the revenue function of retailer is:
Πr ,1 = ϕ[( p − s ) x + sq ] + ϕ(Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q − wq, x < q
Πr = 
(25) .
x≥q
Πr ,2 = ϕpq + ϕ(Cm − Crm − b2 )εb2 q − wq,
Compared function (24) and (25), we find that the decision that maximize retailer’s revenue also maximize
the whole closed-loop supply chain system, and the decision has nothing to do with revenue sharing ratio ϕ , so
when w = w* , b2*r = b2*sc , the closed-loop supply chain can achieve perfect coordination.
4.

NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
The above theoretical analysis reveals the interaction between decision variables and objective functions. In
this section, we use numerical analysis to verify the conclusions we derived above. We assume market demand
D conform uniform distribution U ~ [0,100], set p = 15, Cm = 8, Crm = 5, ϕ = 0.55, s = 3, ε = 0.05 . In this
example, we assume recycling price is the optimal recycling price, and let b2*r = b2*sc . Substituting the above
parameter values to the relevant model, we can derive b1* = 1.65 ， b2* = 1.5 . From the above proposition, we
know that the expected utility function is a concave function on order quantity Q under loss aversion. In figure 1,
we describe the expected utility function of manufacturer, retailer and the closed-loop supply chain system.
Figure 1 is consistent with our conclusions. Figure 1 is obtained when λ = 1.8, w = 4 .
In figure 2, we describe the retailer’s and supply chain system’s expected utility function under both risk
neutral and loss aversion. From figure 2, we can see that for both decentralized and centralized closed-loop
supply chain system, expected utility under loss averse is less than under risk neutral.

Figure 1 Expected utility function under loss averse

Figure 3 The impact of loss averse on wholesale price

Figure 2 The impact of loss aversion on expected utility

Figure 4 The impact of loss averse on optimal order quantity
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From above proposition, we know the wholesale price is decrease with the retailer’s loss aversion
coefficient and increase with the manufacturer’s loss aversion coefficient. Loss aversion coefficient λ > 1 , figure
3 describe the change of wholesale price figure on λ , we assume order quantity Q=50.
In section 3.3, we proved that if w = w* , then Qr* = Qsc* . In our example, we compute the optimal
wholesale price w* = 4.39 , that means when w = 4.39 , then Qr* = Qsc* . In figure 4, we figure the function of
optimal order quantity on loss averse degree when w=4.39, w=4，w=5 respectively. From figure 4 we also can
see Qr* and Qsc* are decrease with loss aversion coefficient.
5.

CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we assume that recycling quantity is effected by the interaction of recycling price and

sales quantity, and study the two-stage closed-loop supply chain under loss aversion. This paper is based on
revenue sharing contact, describing supply chain member’s risk attitude with loss aversion and researching
the impact of loss aversion on the optimal decision of supply chain member and system, this is the
significance of this study. In our paper, we establish the model of closed-loop supply chain, give the
function of optimal order quantity and wholesale price, and reveal the impact of loss aversion on expected
utility, order quantity, wholesale price and recycling price. The conclusions we get in this paper indicate
that the retailer’s optimal recycling price and manufacturer’s optimal recycling price have nothing to do
with loss aversion coefficient. We also compared the size relationship of the optimal order quantity in two
kinds of closed-loop supply chain, and give the coordination condition.
This research need to be further improved and perfected. In this paper, we only considered the closed-loop
supply chain consisted by a single manufacturer and a single retailer, it can be extended to the case considering
multiple supply chain members. Another possible extension is to consider other recycling channels since we just
consider the retailer responsible for recycling. What’s more, in this paper, we use revenue sharing contract to
coordination, future study can consider other contract to coordination.
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